You all know what to do!
The President’s Campaign Rally In Phoenix, AZ Live FeedPost + Comments (409)
Adam L. Silverman is a consulting national security subject matter expert specializing in low intensity warfare (asymmetric, irregular, and unconventional warfare, revolution, insurgency, terrorism), civil affairs, psychological operations, and cultural considerations for strategy and policy.
He routinely provides operational support to a number of US Army, DOD, and other US Government elements. Dr. Silverman holds a doctorate in political science and criminology from the University of Florida, as well as masters' degrees in comparative religion and international security. Full professional bio available here: https://balloon-juice.com/adam-silverman-bio/
Adam Silverman has been a Balloon Juice writer since 2015.
by Adam L Silverman| 409 Comments
This post is in: 2020 Elections, America, Domestic Politics, Election 2016, Election 2018, Foreign Affairs, Open Threads, Politics, Popular Culture, Post-racial America, Silverman on Security, Not Normal
You all know what to do!
The President’s Campaign Rally In Phoenix, AZ Live FeedPost + Comments (409)
by Adam L Silverman| 81 Comments
This post is in: America, Foreign Affairs, Military, Open Threads, Silverman on Security, War
In John’s post earlier today Jim, Foolish Literalist asked a question regarding the US Surge in Iraq, specifically whether if it wasn’t just the US paying off the Sunnis in Anbar. As someone who was assigned as the cultural advisor for a brigade combat team that was part of the Surge in 2008 (the second and final rotation of Surge brigades), I had a front row seat to what the Surge was and was not about. Jim is correct, but…
The US Surge in Iraq had the following components:
That is pretty much the reality of the Surge. But there’s a few additional caveats I want to make. The first is that we were not really doing counterinsurgency (COIN). Despite all the ink spilled and digits digitized between the COINTras and the COINDinistas from 2007 on, we were not doing COIN in Iraq! What we were doing was adapting concepts from FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency. With the exception of Special Forces and some personnel in joint, multinational patrol bases, US forces in Iraq were not living among the host country population. Sure, we took the real estate we thought made tactical sense, fortified it, built bases on it – from patrol bases (PBs) to combat outposts (COPs) to forward operating bases (FOBs) to camps, and then we would roll off them for missions and return to them to reside. This is not what FM 3-24 means by living among/with the host country populace. The Iraqis could not enter one of our bases without permission, without being screened.
We drove from place to place in heavily fortified vehicles because of the IED threat, dismounted armed and armored, and proceeded to do whatever business we had to do. I’m almost 100% convinced that the first patrol that I and two of my teammates went on through Jisr Diyala’s market in Spring 2008 is etched in the local memories as two security contractors (me and one of my teammates) and an Army patrol escorting a US senator or congressperson through the market (we still tease him about it 9 years later – we love you Larry!). The patrol leader in charge of our security, and properly wary of the bad guys looking to exploit our newness in theater and having improper knowledge, kept us moving through, which partially negated why I wanted to tour the market – to get an idea of how well stocked it was, where the goods were coming from, and who and how many locals were in the market. Technically we were following GEN Petreaus’s oft stated concept, adapted from MG Buford’s own cavalry directives during the Civil War, to move mounted, work dismounted. But it was only a technicality.
Finally, in regard to the US Surge in Iraq, the closest we got to actually doing counterinsurgency was trying to work by, with, and through the Iraqis. This covered everything from training Iraqi security forces to overseeing the Sons of Iraq programs to working with local leaders, elected and traditional tribal and religious leadership. Unfortunately, regardless of all the tactical successes from 2007 through 2009 we had no strategic success. Perhaps the biggest reason for this is that a hallmark of a good COIN strategy, working by, with, and through the local population is that while you are working by with and through at the tactical (local) level you also have to do so at the theater strategic (national) level. The idea being that as you’re tactically building with the host country population you then pull that layer up to tether it to national government and attach the two. In Iraq, even when there was an effort to do this, the connection points always missed. This was the result of failures of the national command authority (Bush 43 Administration) in DC and their strategic priority of elections and a SOFA agreement, instead of reconciling the various Iraqi societal elements with each other, to their government, and their government to them. It also resulted from not listening to the Iraqis. Or listening, but not hearing. One of the things my teammates and I discovered after taking five months and doing in depth interviews with sheikhs, imams, and other local leaders, as well as more impromptu engagements with internally displaced Iraqis,* is that the Iraqis still had scores to settle with each other. This was also clear if one paid attention to the news reporting from Anbar and of officials from Maliki’s government between 2006 and 2009. The Iraqis were telling us that inter-sectarian violence was coming once we left. And when we did they proved that they weren’t just being hyperbolic.
The US Surge in Iraq and Other Thoughts on CounterinsurgencyPost + Comments (81)
I want to make a few, final remarks about counterinsurgency. Third party counterinsurgencies, which is what we’ve tried or approximated in Iraq and Afghanistan, are incredibly hard to do. Bordering on the almost impossible. Think back to the well known ones – the 117 year fight with the Moros in the Philippines, Malaya, the Japanese against the Dayeks in Borneo during WW II, Aden/Yemen, Kenya, Algeria, Vietnam (both the French and the US), and now Iraq and Afghanistan. How many victories are on that list? Just one: Malaya. And the British counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya was brutal. First party counterinsurgencies, such as the one the Nepalese fought, are much more likely to be successful. This is because both parties to that type of dispute live where they’re fighting. They both have a real, existential stake in where they are fighting. And, as a result, the preferred outcome of a counterinsurgency campaign – a negotiated settlement – is more likely to occur in a first party counterinsurgency like Nepal’s than a third party counterinsurgency like we’ve been pursuing.
There are also serious problems with FM 3-24. The historic example sections of the manual produced in 2006 is a mess. There was an attempt to fix it in the 2013-2014 revisions, but my understanding is that the inertia of staffing comments and revisions did them in.** The cultural section is also a bit of a mess and I don’t think it got any better in the revised document. But the biggest problem with all of this is the ahistoricity of the field manual. Despite referencing a number of historic insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, including confusing or conflating several terrorist campaigns as insurgencies, it seems to miss the forest for the trees. It fails to understand and state the specific context of various counterinsurgency approaches.
For instance, the discussion of the spreading ink spots that result from clearing, holding, building and ultimately linking an area to another that has been cleared, held, and built ignores the historical reality of the ink spot concept. Bernard Fall in his Theory of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency explains that the French developed the concept of the spreading ink spot in Algeria. The focus wasn’t to clear, hold, and build. Rather it was to take and hold the oases. Since everyone eventually had to come into the oases for water, this provided the French with the ability to make access to the water conditional on reconciling with French control and governance. Fall explains that the Vietnamese adaptation, the strategic hamlet, failed precisely because none of the Viet Cong had to come into the hamlets, so all the French did was fortify a border, inside of which the Viet Cong could move around with impunity, which they did. There were no oases to hold and connect in Vietnam, nor are there any in Iraq or Afghanistan. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria doesn’t need to come into any specific city. Similarly the Taliban in Afghanistan, as well as ISIS-Khourisan and the Haqqani network. Instead they need to take and hold them as conquest, as part of a state building strategy, to extend their influence and control for their operations, or some combination of these objectives. This is a radically different context from what the spreading ink spot was developed to address.
What I think we’re seeing with the sparsely detailed announcement the President made last night is really Secretary Mattis and LTG McMaster trying to buy a little more time. Had LTG McMaster gotten his reported desire for 50,o00 more Soldiers it might have made a dent, but it also would depend on what we’re going to use them for and how long we’re going to keep those troops there. Basically Secretary Mattis and LTG McMaster are trying to mitigate and manage the slow motion loss we’ve been enduring in Afghanistan for almost sixteen years so it doesn’t turn into a rout. This isn’t just about optics or egos, there are no good military solutions in Afghanistan. There haven’t been over the past sixteen years and there aren’t going to be any popping up in the foreseeable future. However, if we can’t mitigate and manage the failures of strategy, despite the efficacy of tactics, then we have the potential of an actual localized ripple effect throughout the region. Where the problems within Afghanistan spread to Pakistan and India and Iran and some of the southern Stans. This would take a bad situation largely localized in Afghanistan and turn it into a regional mess with multiple, overlapping problem sets (India-Pakistan rivalry, Russian near abroad in the southern Stans issues, Iran feeling threatened by the failure of an American war, etc). Good and effective strategists recognize that there are often no good outcomes to the problems they face. As a result the strategic options they develop are intended to manage and mitigate these bad outcomes so that failure doesn’t become catastrophic and to buy time.
The last good suggestion we had for dealing with Afghanistan was Vice President Biden’s counter-terrorism strategy proposal from 2009. We would be far better off if President Obama had embraced that suggestion eight years ago.
* I apologize in advance for the lack of typesetting in my article that I’ve linked to. I sent a penultimate draft in to the editor while I was on temporary duty in an operational planning team. I never received any galley proofs to examine. And it appears they actually added commas so that many sentences have Oxford, Cambridge, London School of Economics, Kings College London, University of St. Andrews, University of Edinburgh, University of Glasgow, and Trinity College Dublin commas!
** In 2009 I was asked to submit suggestions for improving the culture section of FM 3-24, which I submitted through my chain of command at the time. In 2013 I was asked by a colleague, who had worked on FM 3-24 in 2006, for suggestions he would submit for consideration in the revised manual. He has a PhD in military history and I recommended, and he concurred, that the history section/chapter needed to be fixed. My understanding is that his recommendations on this were ignored.
by Adam L Silverman| 401 Comments
This post is in: Domestic Politics, Election 2016, Foreign Affairs, Military, Open Threads, Politics, Silverman on Security
by Adam L Silverman| 130 Comments
This post is in: Domestic Politics, Election 2016, Military, Open Threads, Silverman on Security
BREAKING: US Navy destroyer and merchant ship collide in waters east of Singapore and the Straits of Malacca. https://t.co/YHaftVR3v8
— The Associated Press (@AP) August 21, 2017
SINGAPORE (AP) — A U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer collided with a tanker early Monday in waters east of Singapore and the Strait of Malacca, and at least 10 sailors are missing.
The Navy said five others were hurt.
The USS John S. McCain sustained damage on its port side aft, or left rear, from the collision with the Alnic MC that happened at 5:24 a.m., the Navy’s 7th Fleet said. It wasn’t immediately clear if the oil and chemical tanker sustained damage or casualties in the collision.
The Navy said Osprey aircraft and Seahawk helicopters from the USS America were assisting. It also said tugboats and Singaporean naval and coast guard vessels were in the area to render assistance.
Malaysia’s navy chief Ahmad Kamarulzaman Ahmad Badaruddin tweeted that two ships as well as aircraft from its navy and air force have been deployed to help look for the missing U.S. sailors.
I will simply note that the President has neither made a public statement, nor issued a tweet in regard to any US service members death since his remarks about Chief Petty Officer Owens death in Yemen at the State of the Union. He did, however, say this earlier this evening:
In response to my question about the USS John S. McCain collision @POTUS at @WhiteHouse South Portico replies “that’s too bad.” pic.twitter.com/G6CK0E8y8Y
— Steve Herman (@W7VOA) August 21, 2017
Updated at 11:00 PM EDT
There is already speculation bouncing around social media that this second collision of an Arleigh Burke class destroyer within two months may be an act of cyber warfare. And, as a result, we are facing a new and very dangerous threat. It was recently reported that the Russians have developed a way to spoof a ship’s GPS.
Reports of satellite navigation problems in the Black Sea suggest that Russia may be testing a new system for spoofing GPS, New Scientist has learned. This could be the first hint of a new form of electronic warfare available to everyone from rogue nation states to petty criminals.
On 22 June, the US Maritime Administration filed a seemingly bland incident report. The master of a ship off the Russian port of Novorossiysk had discovered his GPS put him in the wrong spot – more than 32 kilometres inland, at Gelendzhik Airport.
After checking the navigation equipment was working properly, the captain contacted other nearby ships. Their AIS traces – signals from the automatic identification system used to track vessels – placed them all at the same airport. At least 20 ships were affected.
While the incident is not yet confirmed, experts think this is the first documented use of GPS misdirection – a spoofing attack that has long been warned of but never been seen in the wild.
Until now, the biggest worry for GPS has been it can be jammed by masking the GPS satellite signal with noise. While this can cause chaos, it is also easy to detect. GPS receivers sound an alarm when they lose the signal due to jamming. Spoofing is more insidious: a false signal from a ground station simply confuses a satellite receiver. “Jamming just causes the receiver to die, spoofing causes the receiver to lie,” says consultant David Last, former president of the UK’s Royal Institute of Navigation.
Much more at the link.
Updated at 11:24 PM EDT
The President has now issued an appropriate response to tonight’s maritime collision involving the USS John S. McCain.
Thoughts & prayers are w/ our @USNavy sailors aboard the #USSJohnSMcCain where search & rescue efforts are underway. https://t.co/DQU0zTRXNU
— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) August 21, 2017
by Adam L Silverman| 56 Comments
This post is in: Cat Blogging, Faunasphere, Open Threads
Mom’s here! Mom’s here! Mom’s here! Mom’s here. Maria you’re mauling her, if you eat her face she won’t come and visit again…
Hat tip to the The Jester:
#OffTopicSun Lady aquired 2 lion cubs (somehow) authorities relocated them to zoo. SEVEN yrs later she visited them. https://t.co/xLTrqDcBvV
— JΞSŦΞR ✪ ΔCŦUΔL³³º¹ (@th3j35t3r) August 20, 2017
Sunday Evening Open Thread: Happy ReunionsPost + Comments (56)
by Adam L Silverman| 215 Comments
This post is in: Cat Blogging, Open Threads
Cats don’t meow to communicate with other cats—but to communicate with humans. So what exactly are they saying? https://t.co/FGbcHZHZYy
— National Geographic (@NatGeo) August 18, 2017
Knock yourselves out!
Friday Afternoon Break Between the Breaking News Open ThreadPost + Comments (215)
by Adam L Silverman| 325 Comments
This post is in: Domestic Politics, Election 2016, Open Threads, Politics, Popular Culture, Post-racial America, Not Normal
The New York Times may have breaking news. Or they may not… Basically we’ve achieved Schroedinger’s Bannon.
Going does not mean gone – they're still figuring out when this takes effect. Person close to Bannon says he … https://t.co/4bYxXrJKs5
— Maggie Haberman (@maggieNYT) August 18, 2017
The NY Times reporting is unclear on exactly what will happen and when.
President Trump has told senior aides that he has decided to remove Stephen K. Bannon, the embattled White House chief strategist who helped Mr. Trump win the 2016 election, according to two administration officials briefed on the discussion.
The president and senior White House officials were debating when and how to dismiss Mr. Bannon. The two administration officials cautioned that Mr. Trump is known to be averse to confrontation within his inner circle, and could decide to keep on Mr. Bannon for some time.
As of Friday morning, the two men were still discussing Mr. Bannon’s future, the officials said. A person close to Mr. Bannon insisted the parting of ways was his idea, and that he had submitted his resignation to the president on Aug. 7, to be announced at the start of this week, but it was delayed in the wake of the racial unrest in Charlottesville, Va.
Expect the Mandrill Mentality, the Rage Furby, Lt. JG Clearance Suspended Posobiec, the Breitbrats, and a variety of neo-NAZIs, white nationalists, white supremacists, and the Mercers to proceed directly to frothing at the mouth. It is also important to realize that Bannon wasn’t the actual driver of the problems within the administration, he was merely one of the enablers of it. It is unclear what happens to the allies he helped to install on the White House staff, so those folks may be hanging around for a little while or not.
Updated at 1:30 PM EDT
Source close to Bannon confirms Bannon expected to return to Breitbart after a WH exit
— Gabriel Sherman (@gabrielsherman) August 18, 2017
Bannon friend says Breitbart ramping up for war against Trump. "It's now a Democrat White House," source says.
— Gabriel Sherman (@gabrielsherman) August 18, 2017
It Might Be Breaking News: Bannon On His Way Out?Post + Comments (325)